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Editorials

TWO CULTURES

ON DECEMBER 30th last in New York City one session of the American Catholic Philosophical Association was devoted to a joint meeting with the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. The event, being the first of its kind, bids fair to become historic. Harvard, Yale, Swarthmore, and St. Michael's of Toronto were represented in the readers of the papers and the leaders of the discussion. The topic was Monism as opposed to philosophical Dualism. In the midst of the greatest courtesy and manifest respect for the sincerity of opposing convictions, the two systems of philosophy appeared to be at opposite poles. Many Catholic students present were surprised to see the "adversaries" of their textbooks appear in person on the speaker's stand and on the floor of the hall. The "adversaries" were probably surprised that they had not yet smoked out the Scholastics from their age-old lairs.

Both sides, it is safe to say, were given food for thought, for here were two distinct cultures locked in close encounter. Scholastics were told that every system of philosophy must rest on a set of postulates, and that the better system is the one whose postulates more effectively organize the factual knowledge that we all have. We were there presented with a system of learning which is not philosophy in our sense, but which is restricted to the methodology of the particular sciences. That such sciences, because they are particular, may legitimately begin by postulating theses that are established elsewhere in the realm of natural knowledge, Scholastics readily admit, but they will not concede that the ultimate of the sciences, philosophy, may do anything of the kind. We start, not with postulates, but with principles; with truths, that is, which are evident from the analysis of immediate experience. Far from being mere postulates, these truths are the most certain of all the things human reason may know, and they must be borne out at every step of our progress. If any conclusion drawn from them happens to transcend our immediate experience, that fact does not invalidate them, since all exploration must be expected to carry us into new regions. Let it be admitted that some mystery is encountered in all philosophy, but if mystery is to mean the unknown, let the unknown be ahead of us, not the point from which we start.

Monism is the inevitable outcome of a "philosophy," which, aping the methodology of the particular sciences, postulates that the world be explained by nothing but the world itself. Such a system does not only lead to the obscure, it begins with deliberate obscurantism.

J. McWILLIAMS.

VITAL SCHOLASTICISM

IN NOVEMBER of 1936, there appeared in this journal an editorial that was in a sense prophetic. For its author, daring to look beyond the despair of many Scholastics, saw the rise of new movements that were rich in promise for the spread of the old philosophy. Now, but a short year and a half later, it is with a deep sense of encouragement that THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN notes a new instance of this growing life. During January of this year, there was held in New Orleans the annual convention of the Southern Conference of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. To one who but notes the tenor of their discussions, there is revealed a practical view of the end that philosophy should serve. God, His existence; Religion and Philosophy; Dante, his religious Philosophy; the Will; the Soul: these are titles which indicate how closely interwoven with their lives is the doctrine of the Schools.

For if there is any concept that has been constantly put to the fore by the Neo-Scholastics, it is the vitality of the Scholastic system. By such a contention they mean that the *philosophia perennis* is more than a method of thought and a body of substantiated truths, it is a very way of life. Primarily, the philosophy of Being, it must embrace the entire scope of reality. Everything that is must enter within the realm of its investigations. Now of all beings, the most engrossingly interesting and important is man. "*Mentem mortalia tangunt*" wrote Vergil, and his observation is as pregnant with truth today as it was in the century before our era. Scholasticism has felt it, and has given solutions that are the most satisfying of all the answers ever given: *freedom* of the will; *immortality* of the soul.

These twentieth century Schoolmen have grasped this view, and have done so in a genuinely Scholastic fashion. Their gaze turns to man, but rises above him, for the traditional teaching sees him in his true place: Religion and Philosophy; Dante, his Religious Philosophy. To the philosopher who investigates man, the most awe-inspiring result of his search is his radical contingency, which penetrating into the innermost parts of his being, involves him completely in inescapable dependence. Whether we wish it or no, we are forever wrapt in most intimate union with the Non-Contingent, to Whom we are bound in transcendental relation. And since religion is the sum total of all man's relations with God, it is a question profoundly personal and rich in its implications.

This spirit and method we welcome; it is our earnest hope that it spread throughout our land.

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The Concept in St. Thomas

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A FEW pages will do no justice to St. Thomas' theory of the concept.¹ Still, they may arrest an hurried philosopher with the thought that the theory needs re-examination. That may constitute the value, if any, of this paper.

First of all we must realize what is at stake. In the Christian scheme of things everything which exists gets the measure of its being from God: *Omnia per Ipsum facta sunt, et sine Ipso factum est nihil quod factum est* (all things were made by Him; and without Him was made nothing that was made). Nor are there any loose ends of being, any dangling participles of essence which escape being known by God: . . . *res naturales . . . sunt mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia creata* (. . . natural objects . . . are measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things).² Further, since even *ea quae non sunt vocat tamquam ea quae sunt* (those things which are not He calls as those that are, Rom. 4, 17), we must say that God knows whatsoever is, in whatsoever manner it is.³ In short, whatever is, is known by God; whatever is not known by God is nothing. Now, men too know. Human knowledge, whatever be its interpretation, is a fact. Hence the question: do men know what God knows? If the answer be, yes, the conclusion is that men know being, viz., whatever is or can be. If the answer be, no, the conclusion is that men know nothing, since only *that* is which God knows. We must, then, so explain knowledge that we leave intact the position: our knowledge is of being. For, if knowledge be not of being, it is not knowledge of an object which God knows; which is as much as to say that it is not knowledge of anything. Now, it is in the concept that we first find the relation of object and knowing subject. Of the concept, therefore, we must have a theory which allows that a concept is knowledge of being. The stake is clear: either the concept gives us knowledge of being, and metaphysics is possible; or, the concept does not give us being, and metaphysics is impossible.

A concept gives us knowledge of being. But a concept is not any sort of knowledge of any sort of being. It is not knowledge of any sort of being: for, sensation, or its derivative, the phantasm, is a partial but necessary cause of the concept. Sensation is necessary, since without it we do not know, nor do we utilize knowledge except by reference to present or stored-up sensations. Sensation is only a partial cause of the concept, since sensation is not the concept.⁴ Hence, Plato's explanation will not suffice for knowledge *thus dependent on sensation*. According to Plato it is ideas we know; but, although he thus tried to salvage the certainty of knowledge, still, Platonic knowledge of ideas will not enable us to judge sensible things. After all, on Plato's showing there would be no knowledge of matter and motion, no demonstration by material causes,

and all this is the stuff of natural science. Besides, it does seem silly to respond to questions about things with answers that are not about things.⁵ Nor is a concept just any sort of knowledge. Hence Heraclitus' answer will not do either: according to him the only object of knowledge is bodies; but since bodies are in a continual flux, we should never be certain of the truth of our knowledge about them.⁶ In sum, Heraclitus will not accord us certain knowledge; Plato will not accord us certain knowledge of sensible things. Yet it is certain knowledge of sensible being that must be explained.

The principle commanding the explanation is this: *cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscentia natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius* (intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing).⁷ To know a thing is a way of becoming it. The thing to be explained is this: how can a knowing agent, S, which is itself and nothing else, how can S become a known object, O, which is also itself and nothing else? To repeat: to know a thing is a way of becoming it; *that* is the explanation of knowledge. But what is the explanation of *that*?

The explanation is certainly not this: S becomes the thing which is O. The intellect is not the intelligible thing; *non dixit St. Thomas*, says John of St. Thomas, *quod cognoscentia possunt habere formam alteram sed formam rei alterius* (St. Thomas did not say that intelligent beings can have another form, but the form of another thing).⁸ The intellect does not turn into the object it knows; to know, for example, a book, is not to turn into a book. But might not the intellect turn the book into itself? If this can be done to a sensible object of knowledge, viz., if O can be turned into S, the reason must be 1) because O can assume the way of being possessed by S, and 2) because the way of being possessed by S is receptive of O. Recall the data of the problem: O must be turned into S; but a book, as a book, cannot be S. Hence the book turned into S must be a book which S, by knowledge, is. We need a basis for this double demand of a book's capacity to be S, of S's capacity to be a book. The basis is the limitation of O's form by matter and the receptivity of this form of O (*formam rei alterius*, the form of another thing) by spirit. It is set forth in this passage:

... species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata; natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem; propter quod dicit Philosophus, 3 de Anima, text. 37, quod anima est quodammodo omnia. Coarctatio autem formae est per materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quamdam infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicujus rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitiva, et secundum modum

immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. Unde in 2 de Anima, text. 124, dicitur quod plantae non cognoscunt propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia; et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia, et immixtus, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima, text. 4 usque ad 7. Unde cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, quaest. 7, art. 1, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis.

(... for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says . . . that *the soul is in a sense all things*. Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above . . ., forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence, it is said in *De Anima* ii. that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in *De Anima* iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above . . ., it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.)⁹

It is now possible to state the central explanation of knowledge: although S is not O, nevertheless S in its act of knowing O is the O which is known. The mind is not its object; but the mind in its act of knowing the object, *that* mind is the object in its act of being known. In short, what can be known, is, as being known, the mind which knows it: *intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu* (the intelligible in act is intellect in act).¹⁰

It remains to state the cosmological and psychological suppositions of a theory in which knowledge is held to be the fusion of the intelligible with the intellect in the intellect's act of understanding. The cosmological supposition answers the question, what is this way of being O which can also be S? The answer is: O is compounded of matter and form. But, and this is the point, the form of O can also be the form, accidental of course, of S. Concretely, if O can be S and yet be itself withal, this must be because the intelligible part of O, viz., that part of O which becomes S, O's form, is nothing but O itself under another kind of existence. We must name this intelligible part of O under its new form of existence: it is O's species. Now, the whole point to species is that the species of O is not one O and O another O; rather, the species of O is *O per modum speciei ejus* (in its species-being), that is, the species of O is O insofar as it is O acting upon S. Recall that it is O which must become S; but O cannot become S through something that is not O; hence through something that is O; yet this something which is O cannot be the O as it exists; hence it is O, though existing otherwise than as O.¹¹ This, then, is species: an intermediary which allows O to keep its own individuality, and this it does because it is not the existing O; and an intermediary, nevertheless, which enables O to become S, and this it does because it is O, not existing as O, but *per modum speciei ejus* (in its species-being). Needless to say, one who tries to imagine species, one who tries to think of it as crossing space or as having an existence independent of O,¹² will miss the whole point. The point is: species is a metaphysical postulate necessary to explain how O can

be at once itself and S, which is the very thing O must be if it is to be known: *intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu* (the intelligible in act is intellect in act). We must not, therefore, let the figurative description of species (*similitudo, imago*, a likeness, an image, etc.; how, indeed, can language fail to be figurative?) throw us off the track. By its species O can become S, not because the species is not O, but because by its species O can exist otherwise than as a "brick-bat" reality.

The psychological supposition of a theory in which knowledge is held to be the fusion of the intelligible with the intellect in the intellect's act of knowing answers the question, what is this way of being S which can also be O? The answer is: an immaterial way of being. This answer, already given, must now be more fully grasped. True, *omne quod recipitur in altero, recipitur per modum recipientis* (everything which is received in another thing is received according to the manner of the recipient); you can't get a chunk of iron down your gullet, but you can eat iron salts. Similarly, you can't get a book, as a book, into your mind; but you can get a book *per modum speciei ejus* (in its species-being) into your mind. All this we have seen. This question now is: assuming that O, *per modum speciei ejus*, is in S, is there anything to knowledge beyond O's presence in S? Obviously there is. It is S's knowledge of O. And this knowledge of S is precisely the concept. To grasp the significance of this meaning of the concept, viz., S's knowledge of O under the causal impetus of O's species, we must retrace the steps by which we have closed in upon it. S had to become O. But S cannot turn into the existing O. Hence it turns O into itself. Thus the individual difference between O and S is eliminated. Yet there still persists the difference between S's knowing and not knowing O. And that difference is wholly on S's side. It makes no difference to O whether it be known or not known; it does make a difference to S. That difference is precisely S's knowledge of O, an immanent act, the concept. Further, the mere presence of O, *per modum speciei*, in S is not yet knowledge. If it were, S could not understand absent Os, which it does; nor could it be the O apart from its material conditions which S understands, and it is; nor would S's knowledge be of things, which it is. Hence the concept is an intellectual re-creation of the object, a real substitute of O; it is not S, since S produces it; it is not O *per modum speciei*, since this is the cause of it; nor can it exist outside of S; it comes and goes; its object remains.¹³ The psychological way of being S which can also be O has, then, two phases: first, the immaterial S receives into itself the immaterialized O, namely, *per modum speciei ejus*; secondly, S, thus informed, produces the concept.

Haec autem intentio intellecta, quum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili, quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium, licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim, quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem; quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat.

(Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation; albeit each is an image of the object understood: since it is because the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding, is the image of the external object, that the intellect in consequence forms an intention like that object: for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation. And since the understood intention is like a particular thing, it follows that the intellect by forming this intention understands that thing.)¹⁴

That description of the concept may be made still clearer by these explicit contrasts. The concept, S's knowledge of O, is *not* 1) the thing which is known—because the thing is sometimes outside of S; the concept is *not* 2) the intelligible species of the thing which is known—since that species is a principle of knowledge, not knowledge itself; the concept is *not* 3) the action of S which produces the concept—rather, the concept is the term of that action. The concept is the likeness, conceived by S, of O.¹⁵

Further questions arise concerning the truth of the concept, the nature of abstraction, etc., but enough has been said to justify perhaps the following general description of the concept itself.

Concepts are certainly not the things of which they are the concepts. Things "stay put"; our concepts of them come and go. Yet our concepts would not be of things unless the mind, which forms them, *were* the things of which it forms the concepts. And the mind in its act of knowing is the thing known; it is the thing known, first, by a coincidence of the thing's species with the mind itself; secondly, by the mind's own re-expression of the *formam rei alterius* (form of the other thing), which it has become. (It is in this re-expression, which is the concept, that we have the foundation for truth: *quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur* (for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation).¹⁶ But the truth of the concept is another question.) Concepts, then, are knowledge of, what is known of, an object: e.g., black, sour, animal, etc. What, then, do I know when I have this knowledge, this concept, of an object? I know what I am thinking about it, viz., my concept, for *that* is what I am thinking of the object. Hence, the concept is the object known, if that statement is understood to be the answer to this question: what do you know about the object? The answer is: I know what I am thinking about the object, viz., my concept. But, and this is of equal importance, it is also true to say that the concept is *not* the object known if that statement is understood to be an answer to this question: about what object are you thinking? The answer is: I'm thinking about *black*, say, or something *mortal*, or *animal*, etc. The answer is not: I'm thinking about my thinking. (True, you can think about your thinking, but even then you are primarily thinking about your thinking as an object of your thought, which object is not the thinking of it.) Contrariwise, you cannot say that it is the concept you know, and not the object of the concept, if you are answering the question, what is it you are thinking of? because you are thinking of an object, not of your thinking of an object. Nor can you say that it is the object you

know, and not your concept, if you are answering the question, what are you thinking about the object? because then you must answer with what you are thinking about the object, viz., your concept. In short, a concept is the object known, only on the supposition (which is true) that the object is, both *per modum speciei ejus* and the mind's re-expression of that species, the concept; a concept is not the object known, on the supposition (which is true) that what is known is not the subject or its knowing of what is known.

One may fit a technical terminology to the above aspects of the concept: *conceptus formalis, objectivus, subjectivus* (the formal, objective, subjective concept), etc.; or one may consign such terminology *au diable*. The writer rather favors the latter course. Those terms have taken on too much nominalistic freight.

REFERENCES

1. E. Gilson in his *Philosophy of St. Thomas* (translated from his *Le Thomisme* by E. Bullough, Heffer and Sons, Cambridge, 1929, C. 13, pp. 260-283) treats the subject fully. It is to this work that is owed whatever is correct in the present exposition.
2. St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q.1, a.2, resp.
3. *Idem*, *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, q.14, a.9, resp.
4. *Ibid.*, Ia, q.84, a.6.7. Cf. Maréchal, J., S. J., *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique*, Cahier I, 2^e édit., Alcan, Paris, p. 77.
5. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, q.84, a.1, resp.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, q.14, a.1, resp. (This and subsequent translations from the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas Aquinas are taken from the English translations of these two works by the English Dominicans; (London, Burns Oates & Washbourne). John of St. Thomas warns us that St. Thomas *non dixisse quod cognoscencia possunt habere formam alteram, sed formam rei alterius* (St. Thomas did not say that intelligent beings can have another form, but the form of another thing): *Phil. Nat.* IV, P. I, IV, a.1, B. Reiser, O.S.B., ed., Marietti, Turin, p.103b, 30-34.
8. *Loc. cit.*
9. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, q.14, a.1, resp.
10. *Ibid.*, a.2, resp.
11. *Ibid.*: *Ex hoc enim aliquid . . . intelligimus quod intellectus noster . . . informatur in actu per speciem . . . intelligibilis* (for the reason why we . . . know a thing is because our intellect . . . is actually informed by . . . the species of the intelligible object). Cf. *Sic enim actu intelligit (intellectus) res, cum species rei facta fuerit forma intellectus possibilis* (for thus the intellect actually knows things, when the species of the thing has become a form of the possible intellect), *Comp. Theol.*, c.83. (This chapter is an excellent summary of the whole theory.) Cf., too, *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, q.85, a.2, resp. et ad lum.: *. . . quidam posuerunt quod vires quae sunt in nobis cognoscitivae, nihil cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones, puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, scilicet speciem intelligibilem in se receptam: et secundum hoc species hujusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur . . . similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit . . . id quod intelligitur primo est res, cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo . . . intellectum est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur, quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, in quantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus, sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu. Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius.*

(Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood . . . the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands . . . that which is primarily under-

stood is the object, of which the species is the likeness . . . the thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.)

12. *Ibid.*, a.2, resp.

13. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Contra Gent.*, L. I, c.53: . . . *considerandum est quod intellectus per speciem rei formatus intelligendo format in seipso quamdam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est, eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem; in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit. Sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse, nisi intellectus intentionem sibi praedictam formaret.*

(It must furthermore be observed that the intellect informed by the species of the object, by understanding produces in itself a kind of intention of the object understood, which intention reflects the nature of that object and is expressed in the definition thereof. This indeed is necessary: since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this point agrees with the imagination: yet the intellect has this besides, that it understands a thing as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention.)

Cf. also *ibid.*, 1.IV, c.11: *Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quaequidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur, neque est ipsa substantia intellectus, sed est quaedam similitudo concepta intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum. Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur; unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectus. Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae etiam in ipso intellectu consistit, non autem esse intellectus nostri, cujus esse non est suum intelligere.*

(By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible species is known as the *inner word*, that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it reflects on its action: for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas. Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act.)

See too *Sum. Theol.*, Ia, q.85, a.1.

14. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Contra Gent.*, 1.I, c.53. Cf. *De Potentia*, Q.9, a.5: *Id autem quod est per se intellectum non est res illa cujus notitia per intellectum habetur, cum illa quandoque sit intellecta in potentia tantum, et sit extra intelligentem, sicut cum homo intelligit res materiales, ut lapidem vel animal aut aliud huiusmodi: cum tamen oporteat quod intellectum sit in intelligente, et unum cum ipso. Neque etiam intellectum per se est similitudo rei intellectae, per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum. Intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi secundum quod fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest operari secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam. Haec ergo similitudo se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium, ut calor est principium calefactionis, non sicut intelligendi terminus. Hoc ergo est primo et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in se ipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae operationes intellectus, in III Anima (cōm. 12). Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur verbum interius, hoc enim est*

quod significatur per vocem; non enim vox exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum intelligere; sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem; ut cum dico, homo, vel, homo est animal.

(What is understood in itself is not that thing the knowledge of which comes through the intellect. For that thing is at times only potentially in the intellect and is outside the one understanding (for example, when a man knows material things, as a stone or an animal or something else of the kind); but that which is understood must be in the knowing agent, and one with it. Neither again is the thing known of itself the likeness of the understood object, by which the intellect is determined to the act of intelligence. For the intellect cannot understand except inasmuch as it comes into act by this similitude, just as nothing else can operate inasmuch as it is in potentiality, but only as actuated by a form. Thus this similitude in the act of intelligence has the function of a principle of understanding (as heat is the principle of the act of heating), and not as the term of the act of intelligence. That therefore is understood in the first place and of itself which the intellect conceives in itself in conjunction with the thing understood, whether that thing be a definition, or a judgment: since these latter constitute the two operations of the intellect . . . What is thus conceived by the intellect is called the interior word, for this is what is signified by the spoken word. For the exterior word does not signify the intellect, or the intelligible form of the intellect, or the act of intelligence itself; but the concept of the intellect, through the mediation of which it represents the thing: as when I say, Man; or, Man is an animal.)

15. *De Potentia*, Q.8, a.1: *Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum; conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus; cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu: actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus; sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem. Huiusmodi ergo conceptio, sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat. Oritur quidem ab intellectu per suum actum; est vero similitudo rei intellectae. Cum vero intellectus se ipsum intelligit, verbum praedictum, sive conceptio, ejusdem est propago et similitudo, scilicet intellectus se ipsum intelligentis. Et hoc ideo contingit, quia effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam: forma autem intellectus est res intellecta. Et ideo verbum quod oritur ab intellectu, est similitudo rei intellectae . . .*

(The understanding agent in the act of understanding can have a relation to four things: namely, to the object which is understood, to the intelligible species (by which the intellect is actualized), to its own act of understanding, and to the conception of the intellect. Now this conception differs from the three other things that have been mentioned. It is different than the object understood because this latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas the conception of the intellect is only within the intellect; moreover, the conception of the intellect is related to the thing understood as to its end, since it is precisely to know that object that the intellect forms within itself a conception of it. The conception of the intellect differs from the intelligible species: for the species, by which the intellect is actualized, is considered as the principle of the action of the intellect, since every agent acts according as it is in act; but it comes into act by some form, which must be the principle of action. The conception of the intellect differs again from the action of the intellect because the former is considered as the term of that action and as something constituted by it. For the intellect formulates by its action

a definition of the thing or even an affirmative or negative proposition. Now this conception of the intellect within us is properly called a word, for it is this which is signified by the exterior word. The external word signifies, not the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the conception of the intellect, through the agency of which the word is referred to the object. Hence this kind of conception, or word, by which our intellect understands a thing apart from itself, arises from something else and represents something other than the intellect. Its origin is indeed the intellect by its own act; but it is a likeness of the thing understood. When however the intellect

knows itself, the word or conception of which we have been speaking is at once the offspring and the likeness of the same thing, that is, of the intellect knowing itself. And this happens because an effect is likened to its cause according to its form; but the form of the intellect is the thing understood. Consequently the word which springs from the intellect is a likeness of the thing understood.)

16. *Sum. Contra Gent.*, 1.1, c.53. Cf. too *De Potentia*, Q.9, a.5, ad resp.; *De Natura Verbi Intellectus: cum ergo intellectus, sqq.*, and: *ex dictis manifestum est, sqq.*; *De Intellectu et Intelligibili, ad ideo intelligere, sqq.*

Hutchins and Dewey Again

(Concluded)

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IN A previous discussion I developed the idea of human activity as activity governed by consciously chosen ends. By reducing the choice of these ends to a science independent of the particular natural sciences the way was opened for a discussion of the principles involved in the construction of such a science of ends.

We must first lay down a general principle. I have said that an aim must be a possible end of the concrete activity, within the power of obtainable means, and not imposed from a world of ideals arbitrarily conceived.¹ But more than this I emphasized the fact that the aim must be the result of "intelligent choice."²

What are the elements of this intelligent choice? Obviously it implies a voluntary quality; choice means that of two or more alternatives one is taken, elected, willed. It implies conscious recognition of the elements involved; for "it (an aim) means foresight of the alternative consequences attendant upon acting . . . in different ways."³ But of these alternatives why is one and not another the object of intelligent choice? Why do we, in Dewey's example,⁴ choose to stamp out the mosquito when we once recognize its agency in the spread of malaria? Why does a man choose honesty rather than crime? Because, in the eye of intelligence, these ends appear worthy objects of our choice, of our desire. They possess some quality by which they are recognized as *desirable*.

In the light of these considerations we can put down now a very general principle which is, perhaps, obvious but is certainly essential. *The desirable is the end to be chosen.*

This basic principle is common to all men, whether they are engaged in matters of no moment or in affairs of state. In the preview of any concrete activity, it is the desirable alternative that we consciously erect into a guiding end, "a factor in determining present observations and choice of ways of acting."⁵

Now we must lay down one other general principle. The individual concrete choice will be determined by the desirable end of the given process. The general norm for desirability must arise therefore from a study of the activity before us, in its individuality and in its completeness. I say in its individuality, because an aim imposed without reference to the elements of the given situation will be an ideal aim that does not possess a realistic desirability.

Furthermore, any given concrete activity can be subsumed into a larger complexus of activity.⁶ In the determination of desirability in the concrete it is as unrealistic to omit this larger relationship, as it would be to bring in an aim outside the specific activity itself. Therefore, the concrete situation must be viewed, as far as possible, in its completeness.

Hence we can say that the desirability of a concrete end can only be judged by considering the actor and the act with all their relationships or "ramifications." The *norm of desirability* must be the human individual involved (since we are dealing with human activity) taken with all his intrinsic elements and his extrinsic relationships, together with all the ramifications of the act under consideration.

Now, to narrow our statement yet further, what is it in the concrete case that marks an end as desirable? Let us use Dewey's own philosophy as our example and type. What is the large conception, the general aim that he makes his own, for education, for society, for the individual? It is his conception of democracy.⁷ And it is a frame of reference for life and all morality, for "the *moral* and the *social* quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, *identical* with each other,"⁸ and democracy is the desirable form of *society*.

Now why does John Dewey set up democracy as a frame of reference for our acts? Because it fulfills the "two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life," namely "the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups."⁹ Democracy is, in brief, the perfection of the social life. But why should the perfection of the social life be set up as an all-pervading norm or frame of reference? The answer again is that social life is the perfection of man. The starting point of Dewey's inquiry is the social nature of man as placed in the environment of society. The definition of Dewey's democracy given by Max C. Otto makes this yet more clear. Democracy he describes as "an intelligent use of cooperative means for the progressive attainment of significant personalities."¹⁰ Democracy is the objective perfecting of man.

I give Dewey's view not in the sense that I accept its content, but only in the sense of an example or type. For

implicit in this position is the principle that what is desirable is the objective perfection of a concrete complexus consisting of an actor, his act, and the relations of them both. The thing in the individual case that is worthy of being an object of an intelligent choice, the thing that should be chosen, is the *objective perfection* of the concrete complexus of activities.

In the previous discussion we pointed out that a science of ends would not only have need of principles of its own but that it would depend upon and borrow from the other sciences. We have laid down the general principles: namely, the first principle of action that the *desirable is to be chosen*, and the general norm of desirability as *objective perfection* in a concrete case. The point is now reached where it would be essential to borrow from other sciences.

I did not outline Dewey's thought with reference to democracy only as an example but also to bring the whole discussion down to the point where the order of action touches the order of knowledge, where we pass from the consideration of the dynamic planning towards ends to the static answer of questions dealing with natures and the objective perfecting of them. Dewey must rest his dynamic program on a conception of the social nature of man and the perfecting of that nature in a democracy. This certainly appears to involve a number of *unconscious assumptions*.

I am now prepared, then, to draw the discussion together and bring it to bear more directly on the immediate controversy. I have not been attempting to build a system of ethics. I have been attempting to bring out the real point of the controversy and to answer the position of Dewey by a practical illustration. Dewey hints that he would like to see "specimens" of the fixed truths advocated by President Hutchins.¹¹ I have drawn two of them from his own thinking. Will he maintain that the two principles laid down above are not intrinsic to every thinking man's activity? They are implicit in every page of Chapters VII and VIII in *Democracy and Education*. Much of the difficulty of this controversy lies in a misconception of the nature of these principles. They do not exist in "splendid isolation" in some Platonic world of subsistent ideas. They are the "commonness" found in different concrete events that show similar elements. Why can I write on the same subjects about which Dewey writes? Because there is enough basic similarity in us that the laws of thought for him are the laws of thought for me.

Along this line I have shown that the first principle of action applies to the concrete totality of an act; that the desirability of ends is not to be decided in an *a priori* way by some law arbitrarily imposed from without. The line of attack, therefore, followed by Dewey, when he thinks at the outset to exclude all Scholastic and Aristotelian systems as imposing ends from without, is decidedly off the track. The end to be chosen arises from the concrete individual case; it grows from the interior, and the exact formulation of it in each case is unique and individual. Only because the general configuration of elements, of the actor and the act, roughly repeat themselves, can this

formulation be worked out into a general law. This general formula or law can be said to be eternal in the sense that it will appear from the interior of the concrete set-up whenever the elements of that set-up repeat the former ones. Thus an intelligent mind would decide that a working man with a wife and five children should not squander his meager wage in a tavern. But since, in human society, these elements can and do repeat themselves in similar relation, this decision can be generalized and called a law. This is not to impose aims from without; this is to draw the aim out of the repetition.

I shall now try to summarize the whole discussion. John Dewey finds his greatest philosophical objections to lie against Hutchins' conception of reason as opposed to experience: reason "purely theoretical," "divorced from experience," holding and proposing "eternal and fixed truths," "authoritarian" and not-to-be-questioned truths,—metaphysics being the "established system of such truths"—truths which are "there" and need only to be "taught and learned" and are therefore destructive of "creative intellectual" work; over against this the realm of "experience," limited and partial, "holding no value save in so far as parts of it may be deductively derived from the eternal first principles of rational knowledge."¹²

Now, we find the following passage in Dewey:

"Hence, once more, the need of a measure for the worth of any given mode of social life . . . We cannot set up, out of our own heads, something we regard as an ideal society. We must base our conception upon societies which actually exist, in order to have any assurance that our ideal is a practicable one. But . . . the ideal cannot simply repeat the traits which are actually found. The problem is to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement."¹³

He then goes on to develop such a norm of society. But the point is, that this excellently illustrates my observations on the summary list of Dewey's capital charges.

The empirical or experimental method which is criticized by President Hutchins as falling short of intellectual value and as being capable of indefinite expansion without increase in intrinsic worth is precisely the method which would—in the problem Dewey sets himself in the passage above—simply catalogue and "repeat the traits which are actually found." This Hutchins condemned as "empirical science, which placed primary emphasis upon the accumulation of observed facts."¹⁴ And this is condemned by Dewey also as being insufficient for the development of guiding aims. *Mere empiricism is not enough.*

This sort of cataloguing, however, is necessary; without it Dewey could not extract the "desirable traits." Therefore, we must have such sciences of observation. "I proclaim the value of observation . . ."¹⁵ Thus Hutchins. And such a science would *subserve* the more important and more general task of philosophy that consists in the discovery and extraction of desirable traits; that is, a hierarchy of subservience necessarily arises. *The hierarchy is "there."*

On the other hand, Dewey rejects the idea of setting up "out of our own heads" something we regard as an ideal society. This would be to follow the *a priori* dialectic

method of Descartes or Spinoza or Hegel. And it is this dialectical metaphysic that Dewey—unacquainted as he seems to be with Aquinas—confuses with the position taken by the proto-empiricist Aristotle, and by the pupil of the great naturalist Albertus Magnus. "Let me say at once that in urging a return to the intellect I do not urge a return to that vicious intellectualism whose leading exponent is Descartes."¹⁶ Rather the metaphysic built by Aristotle and Aquinas arises out of the observable traits of nature and all reality just as Dewey's ideal society is to arise, by critical examination, out of the desirable traits of existing societies. Hence, intellect or reason as Hutchins conceives it is not "purely theoretical" and not "divorced from experience."

Dewey develops—according to his own statement of method—an ideal of society from a consideration of the "traits" of existing societies. What value has this ideal? Dewey himself tells us: "to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement." It is a guide to action. Here we have a principle, gathered by criticism of existing communities and then used in turn as a general social norm. This is the way we wish to arrive at the metaphysical basis of ethics—to examine the concrete situation and extract the desirable traits and use them as a guide in criticism and improvement. More than this, would not Dewey's ideal have some value in any similar society? The traits are to be derived by an examination of existing societies and—in keeping with the universalizing function of philosophy as described by Dewey himself—applied to the societies involving similar elements. This is precisely the sense in which traits are fixed and eternal; given a configuration of elements similar to the one from which the truths were extracted, and those truths are implicit in it and await only the explicit recognition of the philosopher. These traits are a fixed function of the elements involved and will appear together with them. Obviously, *Dewey cannot object to fixed and eternal truths in this sense, as his own procedure would be nonsense without them.*

Thus Dewey in the chapter "The Democratic Conception in Education" professes to arrive at certain social norms. He put this chapter in a textbook; is it not "there" for students to learn? Will it keep them from being "creative thinkers"? Surely in putting into the hand of students the products of his own thinking (which he must hold to have some sort of validity and some sort of "truth"), he does not think to cramp and confine their minds but rather to enable them to seize his criteria and principles, apply them to yet further subject matter, illustrate, enlarge, correct them. How does this differ from the presentation of such general criteria as is proposed by President Hutchins? John Dewey cannot, consistently with the publication of his chapter "The Democratic Conception in Education" object to the teaching and learning of governing norms or principles or criteria or generalized "traits." If he can safely propose the generalized "traits" of society as *fruitful* norms for students of education, why cannot President Hutchins propose the generalized traits of larger subject matters as fruitful norms for students?

How does John Dewey evolve his criteria for the good society out of the "forms of community life which actually exist"? He admits such criteria are not the same as a mere catalogue of existing traits. How does he extract them? By examining which traits are *desirable* and which are not. That is, he applies implicitly the norms worked out above. His study of social states is fruitful only in as far as he joins the observed facts to these implicit principles. This is the true way "facts are derived" from first principles, in the fruitful marriage of experience and principle. *It is merely a caricature of this process to say that "experience has no value save in so far as parts of it are deductively derived from the eternal first principles of rational knowledge."*

In Dewey's process we have: 1) observation of traits of existent societies; 2) the discrimination in the light of implicit norms of desirability between desirable and undesirable traits; 3) the erection of the resulting set of traits into a norm of social criticism. This last principle is limited to communities, social states, since the subject matter out of which it arose is limited to communities. On the other hand, the principles that guided the selection of the "traits," the principles of desirability worked out above, have a more "generalized . . . value in experience," because the subject matter out of which they arose was wider, being the elements common to all human activities. Therefore, a hierarchy exists between these two principles. Again, *the hierarchy is "there."*

I believe that I have now shown: 1) that the first principles advocated by President Hutchins are "fixed and eternal" only in the sense that Dewey must conceive his general frame of reference—democracy—to be fixed and eternal.

2) That they are not-to-be-questioned only in the sense that principles borrowed by medicine from chemistry are not-to-be-questioned; that they are authoritarian only in the sense that Dewey must consider his criteria of society as authoritarian, with the authority, that is, not of force but of intelligent "extraction" from fact.

3) That they are independent of the "scaffolding of experience" in the same sense that Dewey's ideal of society is independent of the communities from which it was derived.

4) That experience has a lesser value exactly in the sense that a mere catalogue of existing traits has lesser value in Dewey's discussion.

5) That "rational analysis" is as valid as the analysis Dewey employs to reach his criteria of society.

6) That there is a hierarchy of principles *implicit* in Dewey's own philosophy and that the inferior grades of this are inferior precisely in the sense that they apply to a more limited subject matter.

7) That the teaching of this hierarchy of principles will be as stagnating as Dewey conceives the teaching of his own book to be, for it is simply a question of the student's dynamic grasp on the principles and his use of them on other subject matter and in further elaboration and criticism. And I might add that it is just as important to

teach, first and as a basis of higher education, those principles which stand higher in the hierarchy, as it was for Dewey to put the more general discussion and principles in the first part of *Democracy and Education*.

This I believe checks off the catalogue of Dewey's objections. Dewey has come to the attack, (1) because he confuses the intellectualism of Aquinas with the sterile intellectualism of Descartes, Spinoza, or Hegel, and (2) because his own philosophy is based partly on implicit and unexamined principles and partly on unconscious assumptions. Hence, all his charges of authoritarian, stagnant, and crystalized truths, and the rest are sweeping blows at intellectual windmills.

And so we can at last say that the real issue is whether we are to leave the general and basic principles that lie behind all thinking and acting *implicit* and *uncritical* or to make them *explicit* and *critical*. If we leave them implicit we run the risk, a very actual risk, of allowing implicit principles to become confused with unconscious assumptions; we preclude the possibility of further elaborating and criticizing these first principles so as to use them "to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement." If it is the function of philosophy to make "thought conscious of itself," it is preeminently the function of philosophy to bring to light these last implicit principles and assumptions, and to generalize the valid among them according to the extent of the subject matter out of which they arose. "Traits" drawn from observed communities will be generalized to criticize all similar communities;

"traits" drawn from the elements common to all reality will be used to criticize all reality.

That such ultimate and broad principles must be elaborated, and purified, and used in the advancement of thought and education, that the erection and teaching of a genuine metaphysic is an educational need of first moment, this is the ultimate burden of this paper and, I think, the basic stand of President Hutchins.

REFERENCES

1. I use *end* to mean simply the outcome of an activity, *aim* to mean a consciously chosen end.
2. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (Macmillan, New York, 1926), pp. 120-121.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
7. See especially: John Dewey, "Education and Social Change," *The Social Frontier*, Vol. III, May, 1937, p. 238.
8. *Democracy and Education*, p. 415.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
10. Max C. Otto, "John Dewey's Philosophy," *The Social Frontier*, Vol. III, June, 1937, p. 266.
11. John Dewey, "Rationality in Education," *The Social Frontier*, Vol. III, Dec., 1936, p. 72.
12. These expressions are taken from the three articles in *The Social Frontier* by John Dewey discussing the proposals of President Hutchins, "Rationality in Education," "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education," and "The Higher Learning in America," Vol. III, pp. 71-73, 103-104, and 167-169.
13. *Democracy and Education*, p. 96.
14. Robert Maynard Hutchins, "The Issue in the Higher Learning," *The International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1934, p. 178.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

Matter and Form... "Solution or Evasion?"

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IT IS the experience of students of philosophy that most doctrines have a wide ramification throughout the system in which they occur. This is so true of the doctrine of matter and form in Aristotelian philosophy that to touch the doctrine at all is to cause tremors in almost every part of the system. Hence the extreme need for delimiting the scope of this short article. Repercussions that may result outside the scope must be more or less ignored for the present. When the other questions affected are in turn considered they will have their repercussions in the particular area which we now propose to consider. It is this constant interplay and revision of our understanding of the whole mass of questions involved that constitutes the progress of our thought. With the hope of advancing such growth we shall endeavor to limit our discussion to the inorganic realm, where admittedly the application of the doctrine is most difficult.

Besides the difficulty of the doctrine itself there is the extrinsic problem of making it understood to readers who have not been trained in the Aristotelian system. But the situation is such that we must also face that task. A writer in the *Journal of Philosophy*,¹ presumably Professor Harry T. Costello, complains about the vagueness, if not the

contradictions, with which the doctrine of matter and form is infected. He charges that "we become puzzled whether problems are thus being solved or just evaded." It is a propos of Professor Adler's recent book² that this complaint is lodged, but it can have caused the author no surprise, because in his paper before the recent convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in New York he discoursed forcibly on this very difficulty of making ourselves clear to those who have been trained in a tradition different from our own.³

But the situation is still more involved. There are many who profess to be imbued with the Aristotelian tradition, yet find themselves extremely perplexed when they try to apply the doctrine of matter and form to the inorganic world. An example of this confusion within the fold is provided in a recent elaborate study of the question in the light of modern scientific findings.⁴ But the difficulties experienced by these scholastic thinkers is due to the intrusion of the outer culture into the pale of Scholasticism. That outer culture can sufficiently well be described by the term Cartesian. Descartes, abetted by his unconfessed disciple Locke, sounded a retreat from metaphysics to physics—not to the physics of the ancients, which was a

philosophy of nature, but to modern physics which is a metrical method of manipulating the data of observation and experiment. This latter is an efficient discipline but it cannot be equated with the philosophy of nature where the doctrine of matter and form finds its application.

Hence I venture to assume that there is in the Western World today but one type of culture which Scholasticism must contact in expounding the doctrine of matter and form, and that is the "physical" as distinguished from the metaphysical. Be it noted however that the distinction is inadequate. The physicist and philosopher start out together; but the physicist stops with the discovery of particles and their laws, the philosopher essays to go further.

The metaphysician must constantly return to the scientific field to see how his metaphysics fits the physical *cadre*. Nor is there any bar to the physicist's entering the metaphysical field so long as he remembers that the metaphysical quest is different from the purely physical. When new facts have come to light he must not imagine that they upset long established metaphysical principles, for if a principle has merited the title of certain knowledge it cannot be overthrown by more knowledge, it can only be refined and deepened. That matter and form in some sense is true of the material world is certain; new discoveries can only enlighten us as to what that sense is. It is therefore our task to face the problem in its new guise and discuss it in the language of the modern world.

The problem is first to determine whether there is such a thing as substantial form and just how, in the light of modern physics, it manifests itself. After that is done, the only other question is whether that form is distinct from another factor of bodies, namely prime matter.

Form in its widest sense is that by which we recognize two or more things as alike, and at the same time different from all other things. Thus the color red makes many objects alike (in that respect); it puts them in a class by themselves, unlike anything else. The forms which come into our immediate experience are in fact accidents. But some accidents are necessary, "proper," or properties; others are contingent, or "logical" accidents. Different sets of properties indicate different *kinds of substance*. But can substances themselves be different in kind? Can substances, apart from all accidents, belong to different species, have different *substantial forms*? The Aristotelians answer, Yes.

To philosophers of the tradition of Locke the very question is meaningless. They regard substance as an inert something, the *same* sort of thing in all bodies, a dead core into which accidents are stuck as pins in a pin-cushion, or upon which accidents dance. Thus the only way substances could differ would be by different kinds of accidents. For Aristotelians the properties, the proper accidents, do not constitute but only manifest the differences in the very substances themselves. Minerals, plants, animals, and men have different sets of properties which manifest orders of *substances*.

It is imperative here to say a word about energy. Locke's tradition has misrepresented substance as inert. But according to true Aristotelianism, substance is not "a sort

of dead receptacle for a particular set of accidents."⁵ Substance is itself dynamic. The very fact that efficient causes are said ultimately to be substance is sufficient indication that substance is considered to be of itself active. The *form* of which Aristotle makes so much he distinctly denominates "substance," not accident, and repeatedly calls "energy." And by *energy* he meant "the worker or architect *within*." In science today *energy* has two meanings: (1) an agent capable of activity—in which case it is really substance; (2) the activity itself—which, being a condition or state of the substance, is accident.

"Matter" also has at least two meanings: (1) that which occupies space; (2) mass, or inertia. The first meaning does not of itself connote energy, but since it signifies something that can exist by itself, it fulfils the definition of substance. But the second meaning, *mass*, expressly indicates energy.⁶ Mass is as truly a form of energy as are the other forms called by that name, such as electric charge or radiation. We must not allow a nomenclature which contrasts *matter* and *energy* (or *inertia* and *energy*) to confuse the issue. When "matter" is said to be converted into energy, all that is meant is that mass—one kind of energy—is converted into other kinds of energy. There is nothing altogether new in this; the convertibility of the various forms of energy has long been known.

The reader may object that the particular point in question is that matter is converted into radiation; or, to put it another way: energy, from the tightly packed state of "mass," leaps out by radiation into space. Surely this means a dispersion of substance itself. The answer is obvious: if radiation is mere vibration, or more properly a moving strain, in an ether-medium, then it is an accident of that medium and need not entail any dispersion of the substance from which it is emanating; if it is a shower of particles, it would indeed seem to be a dispersion of substance. But in the latter case is it so astonishing that an atom should emit or absorb particles? Surely an organism is as substantial and individual as an atom, and yet every organism that breathes is continually emitting and absorbing particles. That in the case of organisms this process is more definitely under an intrinsic or immanent control, does not alter the fact that in both cases a natural agent emits and absorbs substantial particles. Let us therefore have an end of the pretense that Aristotelian metaphysics is helpless before such facts as the mutual conversion of "matter" and "energy."

But Aristotelian physics is outmoded. Here again we have ambiguity. *Outmoded* may mean (1) that a simpler formula, or law, has been found to account for natural phenomena; thus the Ptolemaic system was *outmoded* by the Copernican; or (2) that more phenomena have been observed, as the reflecting mirror records more stars than can be seen through the telescope. In the first sense scientific laws are continually being outmoded, as the nineteenth century physics was outmoded by the early twentieth, and as the latter is being outmoded today. In the second sense outmoding does not mean the rejection of formerly accepted data, except in so far as they were falsely reported as facts; the advance consists in the accumulation

of more data, without replacing the earlier and rougher data. But if these rougher data could find no explanation other than the doctrine of matter and form, then it is futile to suppose that later data can exclude that explanation.

However badly Aristotle, relying on the physics of his day, was mistaken about the elements and their mutual transmutation, he was not mistaken about the fact that natural bodies are subject to very definite classification. Modern science, as well as continued common observation, has done nothing so much as bear him out emphatically in that contention. Innumerable specimens belong to species sufficiently distinct to exclude any explanation by pure chance, as Democritus attempted in his blizzard of atoms. Pure chance excluded, there are but two alternatives: either some external architect builds and operates each natural body, as a man builds and operates a machine; or the determinant is within the matter itself. The first alternative is discarded as puerile. The second is no other than substantial form.

Instead of delaying on a point more fully discussed elsewhere,⁷ we must turn at once to the question: Is there, besides substantial form, another component of bodies, called prime matter? It is doubtful whether one trained in the Cartesian tradition really grasps what this question means. Descartes by making extension the essence of corporeal substance, implied that when you have discovered the integral (spatial) parts of a body you have discovered all its knowable essence. This sort of analysis is sufficient for scientific investigation. But it would be a poor philosophy that proposed to go no further than that. It is notorious that science today strives to reduce all its data to quantitative measurements, but both scientist and philosopher must recognize that qualities as they exist in the object are characters in their own right and not identical with quantity. Quantity in its irreducible meaning is simply extension. Everything else is quality. Thus even shape and size are qualities.⁸ If these be taken away from extension it is clear that extension is altogether indefinite. Thus the physicist measuring objects accepts, or imposes on them, at least a size and shape; he cannot use *simon-pure* extension. But the philosopher wishes to learn whether the qualities and the extension are due to the same identical source or principle. If, for instance—to take the question in its very simplest phase—natural bodies, whether atoms or animals, assume of themselves a size and shape sufficiently uniform to be characteristic of the type (and all natural bodies do that) the philosopher is concerned to know whether there not two principles in the body; one the principle of extension, the other the principle of the qualities. This quest is a difficult one, but if successful, will reveal the ultimate essence of bodies, their hylemorphic constitution. It is quite clear that if there really be two such essential parts—substantial form and prime matter—they do not exist separately in different spatial parts of the body; they co-exist throughout the entire body. That is the point which minds trained only in physics never seem quite to comprehend.

It is probably from a desire at least to put the problem within the grasp of such minds that Mitterer suggests a

modification, to wit, that "matter" (suppressing the "prime") be taken to mean the particles, and "form" their arrangement or structure. This leaves the question on the purely descriptive level, and although that may be sufficient for scientific purposes, it is vain to suppose that the physics of Aristotle and St. Thomas was meant to be no more than descriptive. Structure has always been an obvious thing about natural bodies, and modern discoveries have simply revealed it on a more minute scale. Structure is accident, but when specific it is a *proprium*; it is not identical with, but only indicates, substantial form. It is a resultant of the essence, not a constituent of it. Hylemorphism is an explanation of the constitutive essence; "hylomerism" (Mitterer's term) is description by *propria*.

But is hylemorphism a *solution* or an *evasion*? Certainly not an evasion, for no one will deny the reality of matter and form in some sense. The material out of which a thing is made is easily distinguished from the form in which it is cast. And when things change their form, something must persist through the change—unless indeed one chooses to say that no object ever changes, but is annihilated and another object substituted in its place. This last is assuredly an evasion. But the Scholastics never resorted to that—though Hume and his followers (Is Professor Costello one of them?) can logically be forced to it. Spurning such evasion, Aristotelians adopted the evident doctrine of matter and form. The only legitimate question left is How deep do forms go? Is the substantial form the totality of the object? Or is there a residue that is not substantial form, not at any rate specific form? Hylemorphism contends that the specific substantial form is not the totality of the natural body, that there is another substantial partner which is not specific—prime matter.

Arguments for hylemorphism are drawn from two sources: (1) from substantial change, and (2) from the irreducible difference between extension and qualities. The second type of argument does not require that we decide which natural bodies are strict species and individuals. Such decision however is a prerequisite of arguments from substantial change—a decision difficult enough on the inorganic level. It is moreover necessary to show that the entire reality due to the form ceases outright prior to the advent of the new form. It is against this last contention that the most formidable objection from modern science is directed.

This difficulty is on the score of the time-interval *between* the departure of the out-going form and the advent of the in-coming form. To maintain that the exchange of forms must be instantaneous,⁹ is to ignore the evidence adduced by science that there is always a "reaction time" in substantial changes. For the purposes of the present paper, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that, since specific forms are *fixed* forms, there can be no specific form in the transitional stage. Nor may we imagine that St. Thomas was unaware of this difficulty, for his whole doctrine of predisposing conditions, or *dispositiones*, implies a reaction time; and when he says that the change of forms is not "*motus continuus*"¹⁰ he is merely stating

that nothing in transition can be called a specific substantial form. Forms are not things to be stretched or slackened like rubber bands; forms as known in external nature are fixed, discrete; they are not a flux. They are the *termini* of *motus*, never the *motus* itself.

Scientific writers admit that their own theories are devices for organizing their information about nature, for discovering new facts and promoting inventions. For this purpose the integral analysis of corporeal substance, or "hylomerism," may be most serviceable, but that does not preclude the essential analysis which the philosopher attempts in the doctrine of prime matter and substantial form. Aristotle and Descartes are not necessarily locked in a death struggle; because they are not trying to answer the same question. When that is understood, the proper intellectual atmosphere will be created for the promotion of both science and metaphysics.

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The Poet of the Schoolmen

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THE threescore years less four of Dante's life fall in the Golden Age of Scholasticism. He and the *Doctor Subtilis*, Duns Scotus, began life together, and Dante outlived Scotus by thirteen years; up to the age of nine, when he first meets his Beatrice, he breathed the air with the *Doctor Angelicus*, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the *Doctor Seraphicus*, St. Bonaventure; as he passed away, Ockham, whose name is used to date the decline, was lecturing at Paris. What was going on during this period throughout Western Europe, in many a university town, and particularly in Paris, is matter of familiar knowledge. Dante was not the man to live through such an age unmoved by the strongest intellectual current of his time. The statement is sometimes met with that the *Divina Commedia* is the *Summa* of Aquinas set to music. This could easily be misleading, but there is a sense in which it is no exaggeration. Scholars familiar with both the works thus brought into comparison not only recognize in the greatest monument of Scholasticism an influence which pervades the poem, but they are able to point to many a *terzina* as a passage from the Latin prose of Aquinas made into song. But the relation of the *Divina Commedia* to Scholasticism does not stop with the *Summa*.

In the *Paradiso*, the Fourth Heaven, the Heaven of the Sun, is given to the Doctors. It occupies four cantos,¹ short a few verses, nearly an eighth part of the *cantica*. It makes a scene not likely to be effaced from the imagination of whosoever has read it. It may be called the apotheosis of Scholasticism. Of the four and twenty resplendent orbs, twelve encircling twelve, each ensphering an immortal spirit, more than a third is set aside to be the vesture of doctors chosen from the Schools. The

roll call sounds the names of so many paladins of Scholasticism. There is Anselm, "the second founder." St. Victor sends forth its famous two, master and disciple, Hugo and Richard. There also is the *Magister Sententiarum*, Peter Lombard, whose text was lectured upon through several generations of famous teachers. There are Albertus Magnus and his pupil Thomas. These names, —Hugo, Peter, Albert, Thomas,—stand in direct lineage, and represent a very considerable amount of medieval philosophy. To these are added Petrus Comestor ("the glutton of books"), Chancellor of the University of Paris, as were more than one of the others; and Petrus Hispanus, afterwards John XXI (to whom students of today owe their mnemonic verses, *barbara celarent*, etc.), along with Sigier of Brabant. Justice is also done to the two greatest of the teaching orders in the *Doctor Angelicus* and the *Doctor Seraphicus*, who are made the coryphaeus, each of his respective circle, and deliver the panegyric, the former of St. Francis, the latter of St. Dominic. Of the remaining fourteen names several are noteworthy, two in particular, as sources to which the doctors went for light, and also because they meant so much to Dante himself. In the Middle Ages the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius was a handbook, and Dionysius was really "the Areopagite." Two names also are conspicuous by their absence. Dante was not likely to think of Scotus Erigena as "the first founder of Scholasticism," but it was through him that the "Celestial Hierarchy" of the pseudo-Dionysius became current in the West. Still harder to explain is the absence of Abelard. His dramatic career would appeal to a poet beyond all the others, and his story brings in William of Champeaux and the founding

of St. Victor. For any mention that Dante ever makes of him he might not have existed. If heterodoxy were the explanation of either omission, that should have been enough to exclude Sigier of Brabant, the great opponent of St. Thomas. No commentator has succeeded in throwing light on Dante's motive in introducing him; and the cryptic words, he "sylogized invidious truths in the Street of Straw," only add to the puzzle. But of such speculation there is no end. A book has been written on the subject of what is not found in the *Divina Commedia*. This group of Schoolmen and the group of ancient philosophers amongst the Virtuous Heathen in the First Circle of Hell are two companion pictures, interesting in the history of philosophy.

Curiosity has naturally not been wanting among Dante-sts as to the poet's scholastic training, its nature and its extent. How much did he know about the lecture hall from the inside? The most satisfactory answer would come from the man himself, but here, as so often elsewhere, he throws out hints that leave us to wonder. His own words, as far as they go, are the most reliable information we have. The *Vita Nuova* closes with an expression of a hope to write of his Beloved "what has never been said of any woman," and with the determination, accordingly, "to study all he can." In Chapter XIII of the Second Book of the *Convivio* he speaks of the awakening of his love for philosophy. After the mention of some books by which he was influenced he says: "I began to betake myself to where she [philosophy] in truth revealed herself, namely, to the schools of the religious, and to the disputations of those engaged in philosophizing . . ." Scattered passages in Rashdall furnish information about the "schools of the religious," but Dante does not tell us which he attended, where, when, or for how long. The best answer that scholars are able to give is largely conjectural and partly based on legend. Our poet is heard of in early notices, such as they are worth, at more than one university. Two, in particular, have attracted attention, Bologna and Paris. As to the former, Dante shows much familiarity with the city, but he has nothing to say about academic life there. It is the oldest of the universities, and it held the primacy in the study of law. Dante, however, seems to have wasted little love on the legal fraternity, as he shows by an occasional fling. Bologna did not rank high in the study of philosophy. The claim made for Bologna that Dante passed there some of his student days is one that Dantists are inclined to accept, but nothing can be accurately determined about the details. The earliest biographers and commentators agree with legend in making him a student of Paris, and the tradition has been favorably received by modern scholarship. A token of familiar acquaintance has been found in his allusion to "Straw Street,"² the *Rue de Fouarre*, in the heart of the district frequented by the Arts students, now the Latin Quarter. More than one sojourn is spoken of in early accounts, and the detail is added that he completed the Arts course, all but the formality of receiving the Master's degree, a ceremony which he was obliged to

forego on account of straitened financial circumstances. For those who share the scepticism of modern critics nothing remains beyond the bald fact, if even that, with uncertainty as to the length of his stay and the period of his life, whether before or after his exile. The statement that he visited Oxford makes its first appearance early in the fifteenth century, in the commentary of Serravalle. It has been generally discredited. So much for Dante's schooling, which is, in a few words, everything that is known about it. At some period of his life, somewhere, for some length of time, Dante was amongst the gownsmen.

But the sum of all that Dante heard at lectures and jotted down in his notebook can have been but a small part of his knowledge. There is good reason to believe that he was to a large extent self-taught. In an epitaph that failed to be inscribed on his tomb—one of three that have come down to us—composed by his poet friend Giovanni del Virgilio, he is described as *nullius dogmatis expertus* (acquainted with every branch of learning). This is probably not far from expressing the reputation he had in his day. It was easier then than it is now to "take all knowledge for one's province." How near he came to realizing this ideal is a matter in which there is room for opinion. No doubt it would be an exaggeration to say that Dante is the equal of Gerbert or John of Salisbury among medieval scholars. But there can be no doubt of the fact that he absorbed a large amount of learning in different fields. His writings bear independent testimony that his reputation was not a mere matter of gossip. How much he made his own of the literature accessible to a scholar in the thirteenth century is a question that cannot be even approximately answered in the present state of our knowledge. Every now and then some one comes forward with a passage from an out of the way source that looks like something in Dante, and occasionally the discovery is applauded as a happy find. In two fields, the Bible and the ancient classics, thanks to the indefatigable labors of Dr. Moore,³ we are in a position to pass judgment. As a result, it can be said that Dante shows himself familiar with Holy Writ, in the Old Testament and the New. In classical literature he appears as fairly well read in the works which were favorites in his day, when the standard of scholarship was not what it became at the Renaissance. To carry on such work of collation over the acres of writings that have been bequeathed to us by the Middle Ages would be a prodigious labor, enough to keep an army of Hercules toiling together for a lifetime. Naturally curiosity is greatest concerning those doctors to whom Dante gave a place in the Sun. But Albertus Magnus alone, with his formidable array of folios, is enough to terrify all but the stoutest hearts. There are indeed a few medieval authors that have been made the subject of study for the purpose of tracing their influence on Dante, as, for instance, by Gardner,⁴ in his *Dante and the Mystics*. But the most important of all, and the one concerning whom curiosity is most alive, is the Angel of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas, and fortunately he is the one that has profited most from research. Excellent

pioneer work was done by Ozanam,⁵ who was followed by Hettinger,⁶ and he by Wicksteed.⁷ Here the topic must be allowed to rest in the present state of research. Dante was a voracious reader. To take the legendary account of him, he was one that could lose himself in a book that he picked up in a shop, one that would read on unconscious of the world outside, while the crowd gathered under his window and made an uproar there for hours. But if he was a bookworm he was one of that rare sort with power to transmute the base into the precious. Just how much literature he devoured, and what writers escaped him, cannot be said with precision in our present state of knowledge. The *argumentum silentii* must be judiciously used, but on the other hand it is certain that Dante makes allusion to authors whom he knew only by name or at second-hand.

Obviously, the whole of the *Summa*—still less, all the tomes of all the Scholastics—is not to be put into a single poem, not even into one of the length of some twenty thousand lines. Even if one head could hold it all, the poet has no such intention as to furnish a compendium. His purpose is far other. Structurally, there is nothing in all literature to compare with the *Divina Commedia*. Like the Divine Architect, Dante builds in number, weight, and measure. Everything, everywhere, within the poem is fitted into its place as, in a minster, the details in the outlines. In the spirit of an architect the poet uses ornament, not for its own sake, but to make beautiful some member which has a right to exist as something necessary or useful. These considerations might seem to be running into the aesthetics of the poem, but they have much to do with its relation to the *Summa*. The structure of the poem, while not taken directly from any one author, is reared on the doctrine of the Schools. By division, and subdivision, and further division still, the ten Circles of Hell are laid out according to one classification of sins, the seven Terraces of Purgatory according to another; while the ten Heavens are given their intellectual grounds for being what they are, and inhabited by whom. While Dante did not take his classification from any one author, it was from the Scholastics that he gathered many of his ideas and learned his method. And even if he had lived before St. Thomas there would still be reason for thinking of them together: both deal with the *universe*, the one as a poet, the other as a thinker. But the poet has the thinker at his elbow. Aquinas is his guide through the three Kingdoms, holding in effect the place of which Dante makes Vergil and Beatrice the symbols. Dante takes from Aquinas as much, and only as much, as he finds to answer his purpose. But what he takes he touches into beauty—*nil quod tetigit non ornavit*. Such deep questions as Creation; Redemption; Predestination; Matter and Form; Matter and Spirit, and their union in man; the Human Soul; Generation; Averroism; Usury—these are a few among the many profound subjects where the influence of Aquinas shows itself. One in particular is worthy of note: Dante's insistence on the characteristically Thomistic doctrine, as against the Scotists, that the essence of beatitude is vision,

not love. But this is not the place to enter into so vast a field. It will be better to devote the remainder of our paper to a few points of a more general nature.

As giving a tone of Scholasticism to the poem, over and above what has been already mentioned, there are touches here and there which smack of the lecture hall. Such for instance is his remark about a handy dialectical tool: "Low down among the dunces is he who affirms or denies without distinction,"

*chè quegli è tra gli stolti bene abbasso,
che senza distinzion afferma o nega,
nell' un così come nell' altro passo;*⁸

or his rebuke of Scholastic quilllets;⁹ or his free use of such technical terms as *absolute*, *contingencies*, *apprehension* the part played by *intellect* and *sensation* in the origin of ideas, and the like, which add not a little to the difficulties of the uninitiated reader; or, most striking of all, the scene of his examination by the three Apostles in the three theological virtues, where he compares himself to the bachelor waiting for the master to propound the question.¹⁰ Such instances might be multiplied. In fact, Dante sometimes gives us reason to suspect that he is not always above a little parade of pedantry. At any rate such touches serve to deepen the Scholastic tinge.

Dante's rank among the poets is secure with the supremely great. This should not be allowed to "dim with excess of light" whatever title he has to a place among philosophers. There is a philosophy in the *Divina Commedia*. It would sound like faint praise in Dante's ears to hear treated as a succession of splendid passages the poem which "has made him lean for many a year," the poem in which "heaven and earth have had a hand."¹¹ It was not written for the entertainment of *dilettanti* who care less for what is said than how it is said. Of all rewards there is none that would please him more than a halo in the group of Doctors. But what is philosophy? Dante has a very distinct answer to give. His concept will not fit genius displayed in excogitating, and subtlety in defending, a novel system of error. Philosophy is, he tells us, "a dalliance with wisdom,"—*uno amoroso uso di Sapienza*.¹² "Her eyes are her demonstrations; her smile, her persuasions."¹³ The favor she bestows upon her suitor is Truth. His Hell is peopled with those "who have lost the good of the intellect,"—*ch' hanno perduto il ben dello intelletto*.¹⁴ The truth he sought he found in Scholasticism, "Christianized Aristotelianism," it has been called. His was not a cast of mind that would have found delight in supplanting Scholasticism with some new system of his own. A giant intellect can put forth all its strength, as well in building up the ever ancient into the ever new, as in the work of creating a hitherto unimagined spectacle of havoc. It is no disparagement of Dante's philosophy to say that it was not original with himself. Neither is originality the characteristic of the *Summa*.

But we shall keep closer to Dante himself with some words upon him as a Scholastic philosopher. No amount of knowledge, however great, will make a thinker. How

Does the poet acquit himself as a practitioner; in the art, distinguished from the science?

The *Divina Commedia* gives many examples of the poet's reasoning processes. Perhaps it contains nothing that better shows in outward form the typical Scholastic method than the passage about the spots on the moon.¹⁵ Here we see the false theory advanced, refuted; the true established; objections answered. But this subtlety is not Dante at his best. Something far more creditable to Dante's reasoning powers can be found in such a passage as the scene already alluded to where he defends his faith under the test to which it is subjected by St. Peter. But for the sake of passing judgment upon him as an adept in the art of dialectics, it will be better to turn to his work in argumentative prose. The *Quaestio de Aqua et Terra* (if genuine) shows in an exaggerated form the qualities alluded to above in the passage about the moon; moreover, its opening and close help us to picture Dante himself in the lecture chair. But there is no work of his which gives a better exhibition of his argumentative traits than the undoubtedly authentic *De Monarchia*. A masculine intellect is unmistakably discernible in the grasp with which Dante seizes here upon a subject that is always alive, never more so than today. So too is the constructive skill with which he builds up an untenable thesis. But, while he has much to say that commands the attention of statesmen vexed with the problems of today, he weakens his case by letting his ardor hurry him into glaring defects. His error contains enough of truth to give him opportunity for the display of a subtle ingenuity in making the worse appear the better. The Second Book in particular is noteworthy for its admixture of qualities, good and bad: close reasoning, together with a mass of that deserves no better name than puerilities, amazing in a man of his intelligence; and not a little of Scholastic excombry.

Even a cursory survey of Dante as a philosopher would be defective without some notice of Aristotle. The "New Aristotle," with its quickening effect upon thought, belongs to the time of Dante, and it makes a chapter in the history of philosophy. To come into possession of something even approaching a complete and accurate text of "the Philosopher" was an event, and those were days when the vicissitudes of dialectics could stir up as much of a horror in student life as the doings in the stadium can now. Dante shared to the full the enthusiasm which set the learned world agog. For him the Stagyrite is "the master of those who know,"—*il maestro di color che sanno*.¹⁶ But Dante could approach Aristotle only in translation. How much, or rather how little Greek was known in Western Europe before the Renaissance is an interesting subject of research that is still going on. Those who had even a smattering of Greek were few, and our poet was not one of the few. No one now would defend the statement, which used to appear sporadically, that Dante had any Greek, even small Greek. His beautiful tribute to Homer: "See him with that sword in hand, who comes before the three as though their sire; that is Homer, sovereign poet",—

*Mira colui con quella spada in mano,
Che vien dinanzi a' tre sì come sire;
Quegli è Omero poeta sovrano . . .*¹⁷

expresses admiration conceived from the praises he met with in his authors, for instance, Horace. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* could have been known to him at best in the debased versions, current in the Middle Ages, to which Shakespearean scholars trace the travesty of Greek and Trojan heroes in *Troilus and Cressida*. How he must have sighed to read the Master in the original, as in the next generation Petrarch sighed over Homer. And with what delight he would have outwatched the Bear with Plato. From the scholarly work of Dr. Grabmann, *Forschungen über die lateinischen Aristotelesübersetzungen des XIII Jahrhunderts*,¹⁸ it is now known what translations were available; but which Dante made use of is, for the most part, left doubtful. He himself calls attention to disagreements between the versions. He makes use of the term "New," and in the discussion of the topic his statements are considered valuable testimony. What matters most is that Dante was well seen in the works of "the Master of those who know." His quotations range freely over a wide range of the treatises we have today. Of them all, he appeals with greatest frequency to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. According to Dr. Moore, "Dante was acquainted, and in many cases intimately acquainted, with most of Aristotle's various works,"¹⁹ the only important exception he makes being the *Poetics*; and he adds, "the amount and variety of Dante's knowledge of the contents of the various works of Aristotle is nothing less than astonishing."²⁰ His attitude of disciple to master is one of the utmost docility. Only with profound respect does he venture to dissent from Aristotle, as happens in a few rare instances, and then on the grounds of the Philosopher's own maxim, *magis amica veritas* (truth is dearer than friendship). What would have been Dante's feelings in the days of Humanism to see the Master dethroned by the Platonists?

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The Unity of Philosophical Experience

A Synopsis

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Editor's Note: The volume by Etienne Gilson, published under the above title, is the final form of the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University during the Scholastic year 1936-1937. So significant a work should be in the hands of all those interested in Scholastic philosophy. The following condensation will, we believe, be of value to our readers.

IS IT due to mere chance, or to the presence of intelligible laws that similar philosophical attitudes recur throughout history? If not to chance, then what is the nature of the law which presides over philosophical experience (p. 299)?

Certainly, contends M. Gilson, the similarity of the experience of philosophers cannot be wholly explained by their biographies, by sociological or economic factors. The trouble with such explanations is that they explain away philosophy. Thus, ascribe Aristotelianism, if you wish, to the fact that Aristotle was a Greek and a pagan, living in a society based on slavery, four centuries before Christ. You must then ascribe the revival of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century to the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas was an Italian, a Christian, and even a monk, living in a feudal society whose political and economic structure was widely different from that of fourth century Greece. You must also account for the Aristotelianism of J. Maritain by the fact that he is French, a layman, living in a bourgeois society of the nineteenth century republic. Why, then, did not Aristotle and Plato say the same things? Why did not Abailard and St. Bernard, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, Descartes and Gassendi, why did not they too say the same things (p. 301-304)? Positivistic explanations of philosophical experience simply will not work. We must recur for the ultimate explanation of the history of philosophy to philosophy itself.

Then the constant recurrence of definite philosophical attitudes suggests, as its true explanation, the presence of abstract philosophical necessity. History thus contains a metaphysical determinism, says M. Gilson, making his own the opinion of Dr. A. C. Pegis (in *The Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, (Washington, D. C.), p. 27). There is a metaphysical necessity behind the most striking of the recurrences of philosophical attitudes: the revival, namely, of the philosophical speculation which attended every crisis of scepticism.

Before determining the nature of this metaphysical necessity which always made travail once more the minds which were saddened by their own still-births, M. Gilson points to the facts. "Aristotle warns everyone that Platonism is heading for scepticism; then Greek scepticism arises, more or less redeemed by the moralism of the Stoics and

Epicureans, or by the mysticism of Plotinus. St. Thomas Aquinas restores philosophical knowledge, but Ockham cuts its very root, and ushers in the late mediaeval and Renaissance scepticism, itself redeemed by the moralism of the Humanists or by the pseudo-mysticism of Nicolaus Cusanus and of his successors. Then come Descartes and Locke, but their philosophies disintegrate into Berkeley and Hume, with the moralism of Rousseau and the vision of Swedenborg as natural reactions. Kant had read Swedenborg, Rousseau, and Hume, but his own philosophical restoration ultimately degenerated into various forms of contemporary agnosticism, with all sorts of moralisms and of would-be mysticisms as ready shelter against spiritual despair. The so-called death of philosophy being regularly attended by its revival, some new dogmatism should now be at hand. In short, the first law to be inferred from philosophical experience is: *Philosophy always buries its undertakers*" (pp. 305-306).

But maybe this time the pitcher went once too often to the well; maybe this time there will be no wake for the pall-bearers of philosophy. Why, then, have men aimed at philosophical knowledge for more than twenty-five centuries? Why, after proving that such knowledge should not be sought, why, after swearing they would never seek it again, why do men always find themselves at the same old Sisyphean task of rolling up the stone of philosophy which has just been rolled down? Apparently the reason must be, and be it noted that this reason is at least as safely guaranteed as is any empirically established law the reason must be: by his very nature, man is a metaphysical animal (p. 307).

And this reason points to its cause, the nature of rationality itself. Human nature has a natural urge to possess metaphysical knowledge, the knowledge gathered by a naturally transcendent reason in its search for the first principle, of the first cause, of whatever is given in sensible experience (p. 308).

But is such knowledge valid? Are we to ascribe the repeated failures to attain philosophical knowledge to the impossibility of the task? Naturally we might, but not logically. For these failures may point to a repeated error in discussing the problem. Put it this way: are not the repeated failures of metaphysics merely the repeated failures of metaphysicians?

Experience would indicate that they are. Metaphysical ventures fail whenever their authors substitute the fundamental concepts of any particular science for the concepts of metaphysics (p. 309). Theologism and logic failed as substitutes for metaphysics (Chs. I-IV; pp. 3-124); Physicism and Sociologism failed (chs. V-VIII; pp. 125-222). None of these particular sciences is competent either to

live a metaphysical problem or to sit in judgment upon a metaphysical solution (p. 310). As for Kant, who would maintain that metaphysical problems could not be solved at all, we must recall that all Kant knew about metaphysics was mere hearsay. He, Kant, thought that the soul, freedom, God, were principles of metaphysics. In fact they are only conclusions of metaphysics. Did a metaphysician but reflect upon his failure to make conclusions work as principles of metaphysics, he would be taken to be the very root of metaphysics itself (pp. 310, 311).

"When Thales said, six centuries before Christ, that everything is water, though he certainly did not prove his thesis, he at least made it clear that reason is naturally able to conceive all that is as being basically one and the same thing, and that such a unification of reality cannot be achieved by reducing the whole to one of its parts. Instead of drawing that conclusion, the successors of Thales inferred from his failure that he had singled out the wrong part. Thus Anaximenes said that it was not water, but air. It still did not work. Then Heraclitus said it was fire, and as there were always objections, the Hegel of the times appeared, who said that the common stuff of all things was the indeterminate, that is, the initial fusion of all the contraries from which all the rest had been evolved. Anaximander thus completed the first philosophical cycle recorded by the history of Western culture. The description of the later cycles could not take us further, for it is already clear, from a mere inspection of the first, that the human mind must be possessed of a natural aptitude to conceive all things as being the same as any one of them. In short, *the failures of metaphysicians flow from their unguarded use of a principle of unity present in the human mind*" (pp. 311, 312).

Thus we are faced with the truly crucial problem: what is it that the mind is bound to conceive as belonging to all things and as not belonging to any two things in the same way? The answer is—Being. And, since being is the first principle of knowledge, it is a *fortiori* the first principle of metaphysics (pp. 312, 313). It is this first principle which brings with it both the certitude that metaphysics is the science of being as being, and the abstract laws according to which that science has to be constructed. Yet, the intuition of being, with its twofold characteristic of givenness in knowledge and of transcendence of experience, is both the origin of metaphysics, and also the per-

manent occasion of its failures. No analysis of reality can be complete unless it culminate in the science of being, that is, in metaphysics; yet the very transcendence of being entails a temptation to overstep the distinction of beings. Thus Abailard, Ockham, Descartes, Kant, Comte, invested a particular determination of being with the universality of being itself. Truly a transcendental delusion, traceable to the fact that the first principle of human knowledge has been overlooked or misused by metaphysicians (p. 316).

Now, this failure is bound to be ours every time we erect a determinate being into the principle which explains all being. The most tempting of all such false principles is the one which makes *thought*, not *being*, involved in all our representations. Are we to encompass being with thought or thought with being? If the intellectual evidence that being encompasses thought be not enough to make us plump for realism, history may remind us of the failures of those who have plumped for idealism (pp. 314-318).

Thus the history of the philosophies which have existed in human minds witnesses to the existence of a philosophy which has no history, *perennis philosophia*, the necessary designation of philosophy itself, almost, in fact, a theology.

Such is the condensed version of the *Unity of Philosophical Experience*, the final form of the William James' lectures delivered by M. Gilson at Harvard in 1937. No man has done more than M. Gilson to impress upon his generation the notion of the unity of Wisdom—*L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale*. The present work should serve to carry on those who have admired the beauty of that undivided Wisdom to the conviction that, if intellectual evidence be not enough to gain its acceptance, at least the spectacle of the disaster of its disaggregation is sufficient warning that Wisdom is to be tampered with only at the peril of undergoing its necessary and vindictive reaction. Willy nilly, a philosopher had better put up with *philosophia perennis*. If he does not,—this book will validate the consequent—God help him! To one, then, who is disposed to question the claims of philosophy it may now be said, as Carlyle said to one who had announced that she was now willing to accept the universe, "by God, you'd better accept it."

Classics are not praised, except by presumption. They are humbly and gratefully received. This work is a classic.

Book Reviews

KARL BARTH'S IDEA OF REVELATION

Peter Halman Monsma, Th. B., Ph. D.

Somerset Press, Somerville, N. J., 1937, pp. 218, \$2.00

A psychologist, adverting to Scholasticism, tells us how "the trained scholastic . . . will prove to you logically the existence of all its medieval entities." He adds, typical of his sort, "You remain speechless—and unconvinced."

That, maybe, gives one view of Scholasticism. But Scholasticism is logical and, I think, it is therefore possible to follow the argument and even to understand the words. But when you venture into the

field of present day German mystic modernism, you have quite another experience before you. You will perhaps understand the single words addressed to you but you will not follow the logic. You will be speechless indeed at the end of your experience, and you will have no relationship whatsoever with conviction.

For the German mystic modernist will tangle you up with his efforts to explain to you how there is reality, and the highest reality of "revelation," in what you are able to say to yourself in your better moments, in your more mystic self-withdrawals, in your communing with yourself as a phase of God's communing with you.

Old time Protestant "faith" defied even Luther to give it a consistent definition. Modern mystic Protestantism flies to the elusive for its very groundwork. The superstructure it builds is as wavy as a wisp of fog on a morning mountainside.

The above exclamations are the result of reading *Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation* by Peter Halman Monsma.

The author aims at expounding Karl Barth and his theology and professes to establish the validity of a denial of the central idea of Barth's theology. To do this he divides the book into three sections. The first tells of Barth's early background and training and details phases of the development of Barth's theology. The second sets forth with painstaking analysis Barth's Idea of Revelation. The third is a resumé and a critique of Barth's position.

The author writes none too clearly but he certainly writes earnestly and with minute attention to his task and with fearful learning. But the author, however earnest and learned, seems to have set himself a task similar to that one would undertake who would try to carve with chisel and mallet an enduring monument from a raincloud.

R. B. MORRISON.

THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Etienne Gilson

Scribner's, New York, 1937, \$2.75

(Editor's Note: The reader is referred to page 66 for an account of this book.)

WHAT MAN HAS MADE OF MAN

Mortimer J. Adler

Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1937, pp. XIX + 246

In the spring of 1936 Dr. Adler delivered a series of lectures before the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago. These lectures together with an Introduction by Dr. Franz Alexander are now presented in book form. Because the lectures are printed in outline form, a set of notes has been added which explains and demonstrates brief, dogmatic statements in the text.

Dr. Adler is convinced that contemporary psychology is the source of much disorder in education, religion, morals, economics, and politics, because it has taken from human beings the dignity which belongs to them as rational animals. His argument is not with scientific psychology as such, but rather with psychologists who ignore or misunderstand philosophy and its relations to psychology. With the positivists, such psychologists are satisfied to look upon philosophy as futile speculation about problems which science will someday solve, or empty discussions of unsolvable questions. They are convinced that there is no valid knowledge beyond the knowledge acquired by scientific research. They not unfrequently confuse philosophy and religion and because they imagine there is a conflict between religion and science conclude that there is also a conflict between philosophy and religion.

Dr. Adler makes it clear that philosophy is precisely the kind of knowledge which the positivists declare to be impossible, that science needs such knowledge to aid in the solution of its own problem as well as the problems of human society. Philosophy alone can give the answer to many questions created by science but unanswerable by science. If psychology is to deepen our knowledge of human nature, it must recognize the practical utility of philosophy because the basic problems of psychology are philosophical. All the scientific knowledge which has been accumulated does not change in an essential detail the problem of human morality and happiness. Science increases the power to attain the ends of human life, but philosophy must furnish the wisdom to control and direct that power. True sciences can be and are compatible and complementary.

Dr. Adler contends that contemporary psychology has succeeded neither as a philosophy nor as a science. Because it has never mastered philosophy nor let it alone, it has added nothing but error and confusion to the Aristotelian psychology which was perfected by Thomas Aquinas. Scientific psychology has indeed increased the body of scientific knowledge, but it has reached no outstanding generalizations that resemble the laws of chemistry and physiology.

Psychometrics and psychoanalysis are the only exceptions to the sterility of psychological research.

Even though Dr. Adler is addressing himself to the Psychoanalysts he does not spare them. He tells them that they have made a real scientific contribution in their classification of the different types of men and in formulating the pattern of human development, but insists that their analysis of the origin and development of the psychic-structure of man has been inadequate because they accept evolution as a fact, fail to recognize the difference between sense and intellect, between sensitive and rational appetite, and refuse to admit that man differs not only in degree but also in kind from animal. He concedes that psychoanalysis may be useful in medicine when it is subordinated to sound morals, but is full of danger to human wellbeing when it is substituted for morality.

If psychology is to advance, if man is to be restored to his proper dignity, concludes Dr. Adler, psychologists must realize that psychology is a branch of philosophy as well as a natural science, and both philosophers and psychologists must co-operate to bring about a humane condition of their sciences. Scientific psychology must allow itself to be regulated by the sound philosophy which has existed in a continuous tradition since the time of Aristotle.

"A man," says Dr. Adler, "makes himself an authority by speaking the truth which rests on evidence and demonstration." By his own notion he is an authority on the subject. Those who follow the Aristotelian tradition may not agree with all of his statements, his description for example of the "passive intellect," or his discussion of the scope and meaning of cosmology. Those who do not follow this tradition will find his statements challenging and stimulating.

There are a few regrettable defects in Dr. Adler's book. There is no index, which keeps it from being the handy reference book it might be. As has been stated above the lectures are presented in outline form which makes for clarity and emphasis, but for the evidence adduced to substantiate many significant propositions one must turn to the notes, of which there are two sets, one at the bottom of the page, and another at the end of the book.

Making due allowance for the subject matter of the lectures, the text makes difficult reading, for Dr. Adler's language is technical in the extreme and his style is at times heavy. Nevertheless *What Man Has Made of Man* is a convincing book and the author's contentions deserve the serious consideration of both philosophical and scientific psychologists.

CLARENCE WHITFORD.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

Jacques Maritain

Sheed and Ward, New York, 1937, pp. XII, 300, \$2.50

Of course, it is interesting and instructive to see how a prominent philosopher like Mr. Maritain handles an elementary subject for beginners in Philosophy. For that Mr. Maritain proposes to do in the volume under review as he expressly states in the Foreword, "this present work is intended for beginners, especially for students in the latter half of their regular university course." He has particularly in mind the candidate for the baccalaureate at a French university for whom a minimum of one year of Philosophy is prescribed.

However, it may be questioned whether that be sufficient reason for translating the book into English, even though it has been successful as a textbook in its own vernacular. The present volume is a translation of the eighth French edition. Incidentally, the terminology might have been made, at times, more conformed to English usage. To the reviewer the reason is not sufficient, especially in consideration of the fact that several very good texts on beginner's Logic are on the market which are better adapted to the mentality of, at least, the American student.

Furthermore, the volume is offered as one of a series which may not be completed in the near future, at least not in translation. The author repeatedly states that this point or that will be more fully discussed in his *Major Logic*. Maritain intends to treat the entire science of thought in three sections, *Minor and Major Logic and Critique*. The distinction between the last and the first two is obvious enough but that between the first two is not so clear. In fact, it seems

to be based on expediency, to accommodate the "official requirements" of French university students, rather than on the nature of the problems involved. At any rate, it leaves the present volume incomplete as a treatment of Logic.

Abstracting from this, the content itself with its self-imposed limitations, is masterly handled along the usual lines of scholastic Philosophy. The frequent use of helpful pedagogical devices in the form of outlines and diagrams is particularly commendable.

The introduction of controversial matter, some of which is rather subtle and of interest only to a student of French philosophical literature, seems out of place in a book for beginners in English speaking countries. It also seems superfluous to repeat certain phrases in Latin, nay disturbing when the Latin phrases are grammatically incorrect as is the case sometimes.

In brief, the book will be welcome to teachers of Logic because of Mr. Maritain's well-merited reputation as a philosopher; as a text it is a publisher's venture with too many handicaps to be successfully overcome.

J. JOS. HORST.

PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Hubert Gruender, S. J., Ph. D.

Bruce Pub. Co., Milwaukee, Wis., 1937, pp. 209, \$1.85

This book is a forceful example of a man's setting a definite goal and hitting it squarely. *Problems of Psychology* is a text for undergraduates which is systematically arranged to allow definite assignments and logical elucidation by the instructor and easier comprehension by the student. It deals with the more fundamental and such assailed questions of the nature of thought, free will, the Ego, and the spirituality of the soul. If a student sinks these foundations deep, he shall not be shaken by the current revulsions in contemporary anti-intellectual psychology.

The treatment is based immediately on experience and on that intuition alone which follows on experimental data. There are but six theses, propounded only after examining the common details of everyday experience; for instance: "Free will is a plain fact of internal experience. It is also proved by inference from facts we experience before and after many actions." The result is that the framework thus arranged is rock-ribbed in reality, congenial to the empirical-minded modern intelligence and as strong as the individual mind that fathoms it.

Probably the most cogent part of the book is the section on free will, with forty detailed answers to difficulties found particularly in undigested science. The elaborated proof for free will from the nature of intelligence naturally lies outside the scope of this book, but a passing reference might have been made to it, since it is found terminally in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. Both Aquinas and Suarez thought well of it, and the argument is of great value for speculative students. A bibliography would enhance the worth of the book considerably; for, granted the professor would know the standard books of reference and the theories of the hour, the student surely would profit by a bibliography if only in noting for future reading the large number of capable Catholic scholars who are prominent in the psychological field, most particularly in that of rational psychology.

J. McFARLAND.

CHRISTIAN MORALS

M. C. D'Arcy, S. J.

Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1937, pp. 210, \$2.00

Father D'Arcy has again given the intellectual world an important book. As once before, he presented a highly artistic and cogent treatment of the problem of evil, so now he gives a fine statement of the basis of Christian morality.

Christian Morals is composed of two sections. The first of these contains five chapters, which were delivered as broadcasts in England during 1936. This part, though covering fewer pages, constitutes the main body of the discourse, for the second is appended as an explanation of certain points that could be introduced only by way of supposition in the broadcast series.

It is with his characteristic profundity of thought and richness of expression that the author elaborates the concept of Christian morality, as here presented. To insure a sound ethic, we must know first of all that man is truly a composite of matter and spirit. Yet, there is a more important consideration still, and it is that each man is a person, and as such possessed of a high dignity. Such a view is little esteemed in our day, for we are a generation that has rebelled against a Victorian idealism that raised man to a position far above his true status. From this concept of the nature and position of the moral subject, proceed the specific rights and duties of man, first to himself, and then to his family and to society. Thus far, the notion of morality may be said to stand on the philosophic plane. Religion contributes, and her offering is a stream of new and supernatural motives, arising from the love and goodness of God. Further, religion fosters the essential virtues of humility and charity, the one to preserve man from self-exaltation in the knowledge of his high nature; the other to sublimate the attitude of one man towards others, from one of fellowship in pursuit of a natural end, into an inexpressibly higher recognition of actual union in a Mystical Body—one with Christ, the Source of all charity.

The second part is entitled "Elucidation," and consists of five essays dealing with the subjects of conscience, moral judgment, the spiritual principle in man, birth control, Pacifism, and Marx. This last is in our opinion the most interesting and able of the group. Relying greatly on Christopher Dawson's *Religion and the Modern State*, Father D'Arcy shows with great precision that both as a theory and a method Marxism is bankrupt. This refutation is directed also against such interpretations as those of Engels, Sorel, and Lenin.

The chief merit of the volume will lie in this, that it is a clear, cogent, and rich presentation of cardinal points of Christian morality as applied to the pressing problems of our day. That it is not a complete guide to ethics and morality will be readily seen from the summary just given, nor was it intended to be. A post-war generation has created a great need for the re-stressing of fundamentals, and to meet such a demand Father D'Arcy has written this book.

THOMAS C. DONOHUE.

SOCIAL ETHICS

E. E. Ericksen

Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1937, pp. XIII + 351, \$1.75

We are looking for instructive books on social ethics today, but we are again disappointed in our quest as we read through the pages of E. E. Ericksen's work. If there was ever a time when accurate thinking on social questions was necessary, it is in our own day so replete with intellectual confusion regarding the basic truths upon which human society is founded. The book in review presents a sorry example of this. Its discussion is superficial, loose, and in some parts in open contradiction to ordinary common sense. Emphasis on the concrete problem is praiseworthy, but only when the basic ethical principles are discriminately applied. The author manifests neither a mastery of these principles nor, consequently, a wise application of them to the problems he has chosen for consideration. This grave defect is traceable to his broad and haphazard eclecticism, distrust of tradition, and championing of social progress in the revolutionary sense. Closer reasoning would have clearly manifested to him how irreconcilable are some of his views.

Many statements in the book are so broad that it would be unfair to condemn them without qualification. We pass over them, merely indicating that as they stand they furnish practically no enlightenment at all. Other views, however, are specific enough to merit a simple denial. For instance, the declaration that "our basic ethical concepts require modification" (62). Again, the claim that the realization of happiness has for its criterion "neither a code of laws nor an established system of values" (105).

Apart from these and other fundamental misconceptions, in the reviewer's mind, the book merits condemnation for its misinterpretation of Biblical passages, its unfair estimate of Catholic teaching on asceticism, sex, and social questions, and its failure to present a

systematic treatment of social ethics. There is much discussion in the book, but little decision.

One statement deserves highest praise. It is contained in the opening sentence of the preface and reads: "Clear thinking on vital human problems is as difficult as it is important" (vii). Would that the author had fathomed a little more deeply the significance of these words before writing his book.

The format of the book is attractive and meets the demand of pedagogy for a college textbook, but if its content is representative of what we have to offer in the field of social ethics, then our hopes of ever correcting social disorders are truly vain.

ROBERT HOGGSON.

OEUVRES DE SAINT AUGUSTIN, II. PROBLÈMES MORAUX

Gustave Combès

Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., Paris, 1937, pp. 568, 25 fr.

The past year has witnessed several important additions to the ever-growing library of monographs and articles on St. Augustine. An instance is Father Pope's long-anticipated collection of essays. The present volume is no less significant, being a new edition based upon the Benedictine one, with a French translation, introduction and notes. It is the second text to appear in the *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*, following that of the renowned scholar, Roland Gosselin. The series, published under the general editorship of Fulbert Cayré, A. A., also includes such men as Maritain, Jolivet, and Mellet, whose work in Augustinian philosophy needs no recommendation. The singular dearth of convenient editions render this collection, especially the texts, doubly valuable to us. There are, of course, the Loeb edition of the *Confessions* and Welldon's *De Civitate Dei*, but as yet we have no one collection easily available except the unwieldy tomes in the *Patrologia*.

Problèmes Moraux contains seven opuscula: two on marriage and on lying, one on patience, another on fasting, and one on the care due to the dead. Representing different periods of development in Augustine's thought, they are not all of the same importance or value. The chief merit of the edition is that M. Combès has not merely reprinted in a handy volume the text with translation, but in his appraisal of each work has given the reader the benefit of his wide and thorough scholarship. He likewise appends several interesting and helpful notes on topics varying from the heresies of the time of St. Augustine to the contemporary attitude toward fasting. Several of the more prolix and less pertinent passages have been replaced by résumés, thus making for more enjoyable reading, though not without certain obvious disadvantages.

A word must be said concerning the translation, which is in many respects exemplary. M. Combès follows the original very exactly, almost literally, without hesitating to rephrase the Latin to suit the expression to his Gallic medium. The result is a lucid, chaste version which reads more like an original work than a translation.

C. J. McNASPY.

THE THEORY OF MATTER AND FORM AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Brother Benignus Gerrity, F. S. C.

Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1936, pp. 136

This volume is a worthwhile addition to the literature dealing with the problem of intellectual cognition. Its complete title reveals the scope of the work more precisely: *The Relations Between the Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas*.

The author begins with a general exposition of the theory of hylemorphism, carefully explaining the nature of primary matter and of form and their relation to the knowable. Throughout these early chapters, he cites the views of the more important medieval and modern scholastic writers to show their basic solidarity on this question. He then proceeds to a specific application of the principles to Saint Thomas's theory of knowledge. The implication throughout is that any departures in detail from Saint Thomas's conception of

matter or form necessitate, or at least allow, departures from his theory of knowledge. The treatment is complete, logical and clear, and the author manifestly wishes to take nothing for granted. Perhaps it is his zeal for clarity which occasionally leads him into unnecessary repetitions.

He concludes with two fine chapters on "Aristotle and Aquinas," and "Thomism and Contemporary American Idealism." In the former he shows how Saint Thomas surpasses the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form and how this further development is reflected in his epistemology. In the final chapter he sketches contemporary American Idealism in broad outline, and proposes some important points of contact and discrepancy.

CHARLES F. MULLEN.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK

Marvin M. Black

The Cokesbury Press, Nashville, 1938, pp. 229, \$2.00

There are two tempting lines of procedure open to a reviewer of this perplexing book. He may direct his attention to the general and most apparent theme and praise it, or he may attack the delineation of the thesis which is vague and uncritical. No evaluation "in squares of black and white" is due this volume. We have chosen the more sympathetic method.

In a well written and provocative preface the author outlines his purpose: The civilization of our day is vast and complex. To escape confusion, one has need of "seeing things together as parts of a unified totality," of a "synoptic vision." Further, learning itself is so diverse and wide that no one man can command it all, and from "scattered bits of theory" it is difficult to elicit "a unified outlook upon the whole." The purpose then of writing this book is to lift the reader above the maze of the present day to see all things in relation to the whole. True science itself approves such a view. "As the pendulum has swung toward the stressing of the purely objective factors in our civilization, so now it seems to be swinging as strongly in the opposite direction, to a growing emphasis on those inponderables that underlie it" (p. 12). Charles A. Ellwood of Duke University, in his foreword, declares this to be a book which presents "a synoptic view of all the great sciences which are antecedent to the sciences of man and human society" (p. 13).

The pendulum swings back—and it is into the elucidation of this counter-movement that we are led. The author's general theme is this: Mechanism as a final and adequate explanation of all phenomena is admittedly bankrupt. All great thinkers of our generation recognize that Vitalism in some form or other must be present as a principle of explanation. In ten chapters—mines of information that reveal a wide acquaintance with the scientific literature of the day—the author adduces theory after theory to substantiate his contention. Biology, Medicine, Psychology, Psycho-Analysis, Journalism, and the Social Sciences recognize that there is a "more beyond" mere matter. We agree that Mechanism is futile as a complete explanation of anything; we assert that Vitalism is necessary, but we would point out also that not all Vitalism is worthy of approval, since not all is free of Materialism in some form or other.

In his presentation of the views of the new school, Mr. Black's method is to give a summary of their theories, and that without apparent discrimination. Such a procedure, in a sense, valid, disarms criticism, for one cannot always be sure what theory is approved. This much may be said, however, that the mere assertion of the existence of a Psyche is no call for unconditional acceptance of an author's ideas. One may, we believe, accuse Mr. Black of some lack of penetration in approving such widely divergent thinkers as M. Bergson, William McDougall, and Lester Ward, especially if such approval represents a final state of mind.

Finally, we should say that, withal, Mr. Black's book is worthy of perusal. It is an informative book—the product of much study; it is a provocative work, for the subject is ever before us; it is a challenging work, that leads one to consider his own stand on so difficult a question; it is a sincere book, and this is its chief claim to our approval.

THOMAS C. DONOHUE.